INTRODUCTION
I don't know whether it was Yogi Berra or Niels Bohr who first said it-if either of them did-but it's tough to make predictions, especially about the future.
1 That is certainly true about the next round of congressional redistricting-the process of drawing the boundaries of the districts from which members of the House of Representatives will be elected. In most states, control over drawing the lines will depend on the outcome of gubernatorial and state legislative elections in 2018 and 2020. And as has been true since the Supreme Court's decision in Wesberry v. Sanders, 2 the linedrawers will once again be crafting their maps under a set of legal constraints that has changed since the previous round. Mapmakers in the South and Southwest are free from the preclearance requirement and prohibition on racial retrogression that governed the last five redistricting cycles. 3 The Supreme Court has, yet again, refined the contours of its doctrine forbidding excessive reliance on racial considerations. 4 Depending on the Court's decisions in Gill v. Whitford and Benisek v. Lamone, states may face new limits on the degree of permissible partisanship in the redistricting process. 5 The interactive effects of all these rule changes are hard to predict. And just as in prior decades, there are likely to be some unanticipated changes as well. But when it comes to congressional reapportionment-that is, the process of allocating seats in the House of Representatives among the states 6 -there seems to be no real uncertainty. Since 1941, that process has been the paradigmatic "machine that would go of itself."
7 Sometime in early 2021, the President will "transmit to the Congress a statement" of each state's population "and the number of Representatives to which each State would be entitled under an apportionment of the then existing number of Representatives by the method known as the method of equal proportions, no State to 6. Although the terms "redistricting" and "reapportionment" are often used interchangeably, as a technical matter, they are not synonymous: "'Apportionment,' in the technical sense, refers solely to the process of allocating legislators among several areas or political subdivisions, while 'districting' entails the actual drafting of district lines. Thus, Congress 'apportions' Representatives among the states, while the states 'district' by actually drawing the congressional district lines. (1967) ; see also ROYCE CROCKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42831, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: AN OVERVIEW 1 n.1 (2012) ("The reapportionment or apportionment process actually refers to assigning seats in the House of Representatives among the states based on population counts from the decennial census, and is carried out at the national government level. The redistricting process, or the drawing of boundaries for congressional districts, occurs within states, and is conducted by the states.").
7. JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL, The Place of the Independent in Politics, in LITERARY AND POLITICAL ADDRESSES 190, 207 (1890) . Russell used this term to describe the entire Constitution-or at least the approach average Americans took to constitutional questions. See id. His condemnation of the politics of inattention in the 1880s has parallels in our current climate:
But I think there is a growing doubt whether we are not ceasing to produce [statesmen] , whether perhaps we are not losing the power to produce them. The tricks of management are more and more superseding the science of government. Our methods force the growth of two kinds of politicians to the crowding out of all other varieties,-him who is called practical, and him of the corner grocery. The one trades in that counterfeit of public opinion which the other manufactures. Both work in the dark, and there is need that some one should turn the light of his policeman's lantern on their doings.... Could we only have a travelling exhibition of our Bosses, and say to the American people, "Behold the shapers of your national destiny!" A single despot would be cheaper, and probably better looking. It is a natural impulse to turn away one's eyes from these flesh-flies that fatten on the sores of our body politic, and plant there the eggs of their disgustful and infectious progeny. But it is the lesson of the day that a yielding to this repulsion by the intelligent and refined is a mainly efficient cause of the evil, and must be overcome, at whatever cost of selfish ease and aesthetic comfort, ere the evil can be hopefully dealt with. Id. at 198-99. [Vol. 59:1921 receive less than one Member." 8 And roughly a fortnight thereafter, unless Congress acts to stop him, the Clerk of the House will send each governor "a certificate of the number of Representatives to which such State is entitled." 9 Reapportionment will be over; redistricting will be underway. 10 It was not always so. In fact, the post-2020 round of reapportionment will mark the centennial of the most striking episode in the history of American reapportionment: Congress's failure, for the entire 1920s, to reallocate seats to reflect the census results.
11 The reasons for this failure, and the consequences of Congress's ultimate response, continue to shape our politics today.
Historians and political scientists have written excellent studies of apportionment that address the nonapportionment post-1920. 12 But none of these studies focuses directly on the doctrinal concerns that informed, and then flowed from, these developments. This Article aims to fill that space. I begin by describing the constitutional structure of apportionment, the questions the Constitution left open, and how those questions were resolved prior to 1920. I then turn to what happened in the 1920s and why. Finally, I explore the aftermath of Congress's ultimate solution, and how that solution set the stage for the Reapportionment Revolution of the 1960s. The story is interesting in its own right, but I also suggest ways in which washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/10/in-a-new-poll-half-of-republicans-saythey-would-support-postponing-the-2020-election-if-trump-proposed-it/?utm_term=.9a79a42 ccdf5 [https://perma.cc/9658-YUQ7]. And observers have expressed concern that inadequate funding will undermine the Census Bureau's ability to conduct the full and accurate count necessary to distribute the seats properly. the upcoming redistricting will present many of the same questions that the nation faced a century before.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF APPORTIONMENT BEFORE 1920
The original Constitution provided for the apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives in Article I, Section 2, Clause 3:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative.
13
Several things about the Apportionment Clause bear note. First, it clearly requires that seats in the House be allocated on the basis of population 14 -in contrast to the Senate, where each state is given two seats regardless of its size. 15 And inherent in the conjunction of apportionment "according to their respective Numbers," and the requirement for decennial "[e]numeration," is the expectation that those apportionments will change over time to reflect relative shifts in states' populations. [Vol. 59:1921 members, and the total number cannot exceed something north of ten thousand! 18 -it leaves the exact number unspecified. Implicitly, determination of that number is confided to Congress and the political process.
Finally, and most glaring to modern readers, in determining a state's representational base, the original Apportionment Clause counts slaves as three-fifths of a person for purposes of determining a state's population. 19 Today, when people think about the threefifths clause, they condemn it for the way in which it devalues the personhood of African American slaves. To be sure, the Framers deserve condemnation for denying the full humanity of Black people, but that is not why they inserted this particular clause into the document. Rather, the clause was designed to reduce the political power of the slave states relative to the free states, by discounting their slave population-who of course would have had no say in how the representatives apportioned to those states would be selected. President George Washington vetoed the first post-1790 apportionment on the grounds that it violated the one representative per 30,000 inhabitants restriction because, although the ratio of the nation's total population to the number of representatives complied with the restriction, the way the seats were allocated meant that some states received more representatives than their state population divided by thirty thousand would produce. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 449 & n.17 (1992) (describing that history). To my mind, David Currie persuasively explains why using the national population, rather than the population of individual states, is the correct reading of the proviso. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Second Congress, 1791-1793, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 606, 613-14 (1996) . But given the current size of the House, the historical debate is of only academic interest.
19. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 3.
DAVID WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY'S CONSTITUTION: FROM REVOLUTION TO RATIFICATION (2009). As Professor David Waldstricher notes:
Africans and their descendants were not being defined as three-fifths of a person, as is sometimes said, for that would have implied that the men among them deserved three-fifths of a vote, when they had none, or had three-fifths of a person's rights before the law, when they had much less than that, usually. Rather, their presence was being acknowledged as a source of power and of wealth, for their owners. Id. at 4-5; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 89-90 (2005) (explaining that northern representatives at the constitutional convention pressed for the three-fifths clause because otherwise the South would have received additional representatives based on its slave population).
In any case, both the presence and the ultimate elimination of the three-fifths clause show how racial considerations and sectional competition have consistently inflected apportionment in America. 21 And today, observers invoke the three-fifths clause to criticize the practice of counting prisoners for apportionment purposes where they are incarcerated, rather than in the communities from which they came. 22 Prisoners, who are disproportionately persons of color, serve as electoral ballast in majority-white districts whose residents have very different interests from theirs.
23
But for all the Apportionment Clause does, there is one important issue on which it is silent: it does not specify the precise method for allocating seats beyond saying it should be based on the states' "respective"-that is, relative-populations. 24 Between the post-1790 census and 1920, Congress considered, and ultimately used, several different formulas. 30 Each time, the Members were acutely aware of the distributional consequences of choosing one formula over the alternatives. 31 Moreover, in every decade prior to 1920, not only did Congress pick the apportionment formula, but it also determined the number of seats to be apportioned, changing that number each time. 32 Perhaps predictably, with the exception of the post-1840 apportionment, Congress consistently increased the number of seats. 33 [T] here shall be one representative for every thirty thousand, until the number shall amount to one hundred: after which, the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall be not less than one hundred representatives, nor less than one representative for every forty thousand persons, until the number of representatives shall amount to two hundred, after which, the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress that there shall not be less than two hundred representatives, nor more than one representative for every fifty thousand persons.").
1920, it chose increases that interacted with the apportionment formula to ensure that no state actually lost a seat. 34 Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution-the Elections Clausegives Congress the power to "make or alter" the "Manner of holding Elections" for members of the House. 35 Congress's first major exercise of this power came in 1842, when it required, after heated debate involving both constitutional and policy-based arguments, that states elect their representatives from single-member districts.
36
With the move to single-member districts, the question arose as to whether Congress should also provide direction on how districts should be drawn. 37 Initially, the Senate adopted a proviso "[t]hat such districts shall be, as nearly as practicable, equal in the number of their inhabitants."
38 Supporters of the proposal argued "that the general principle was so clear and obvious, that no one could deny its propriety": equal representation required same-sized districts. (1964) , Senator Walker contrasted the general consensus that Congress could require the single-member districts to be composed of contiguous territory with the disagreement over whether it could also require equal populations:
[G]entlemen were disposed to pay more respect to the dirt, and mud, and earth, of which the counties were composed, than to human beings. All their attention was directed to the geographical divisions, but no regard was paid to the freemen that live and breathe upon the soil-no regard to population. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 610 (1842).
[Vol. 59:1921 might "contain any number" of inhabitants, with states manipulating district boundaries so that two parties with equal numbers of supporters might control very different numbers of districts.
40
Almost immediately, however, strong opposition emerged. Some of the opposition came from legislators who thought that, for what we would see as values of federalism, states ought to decide how to allocate their seats. 41 Others pointed to the impossibility of drawing equipopulous districts without splitting or joining political subdivisions like counties and cities. 42 Ultimately, the provision was deleted. 43 The single-member districts had to be composed of geographically contiguous territory, but there were no other federal statutory constraints on their configuration.
44
Even without the imposition of the equal population constraint, the decision to require districted elections had profound consequences going forward. 45 It meant the decline in one-party state delegations at the very moment when competitive two-party politics was emerging. 46 And by requiring every state to draw-and, if it received additional seats after a new census, to redraw-its districts, 47 the requirement for districted elections increased the opportunities for gerrymandering, particularly given the lack of any statutory constraint on district populations. After the Civil War, apportionment changed again. The Thirteenth Amendment's abolition of slavery would have automatically nullified the three-fifths clause of Article I, Section 2, because there were no longer inhabitants of the United States who were not "free Persons."
49 But the Fourteenth Amendment drove home that point, providing that "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed."
50
The Reconstruction Congress was, however, concerned that southern states would nonetheless continue to disenfranchise Black people 51 -in which case, emancipation would actually increase the bonus they received on account of their Black inhabitants.
52 Congress wrestled with the idea of changing the apportionment base from population to number of voters to avoid this problem. 53 But there was strong opposition from New England, both because it "had a disproportionately large number of women (who were universally excluded from voting at the time) due to an extensive emigration of her males to the West" 54 and because many of its states imposed more restrictions on the franchise than some of the newer states. 55. See id. at 95. As part of the 1870 census, the enumerators were asked to provide statistics about the levels of adult male disenfranchisement in the states. ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 79-80. The statistics look like absolute garbage overall. See id. at 80; Zuckerman, supra note 50, at 110-12. And they were compiled before the Fifteenth Amendment, which forbid disenfranchisement on the basis of race, went into effect. See Zuckerman, supra note 50, at 110. Nonetheless, it may be telling that Rhode Island was reported to have the highest [Vol. 59:1921 Ultimately, Congress settled instead on including in the Fourteenth Amendment a reduction-of-representation clause. 56 That clause provided that when a state "denied" any male adult citizen the right to vote-"or in any way abridged" that right "except for participation in rebellion, or other crime"-the state's "basis of representation" would be "reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State." 57 It was against this backdrop of constitutional changes to apportionment, compounded by profound demographic shifts, that Congress took up the first post-Civil War apportionment. In the 1872 Apportionment Act, 58 Congress monkeyed quite a bit with the numbers, giving several states additional seats to which the apportionment formula did not entitle them. 59 The Act repeated, but without any enforcement mechanism, the reduction of representation requirement from the Fourteenth Amendment.
60
The 1872 Act also included, for the first time, a requirement that the districts drawn in states entitled to more than one seat " 61. See Act of Feb. 2, 1872 § 2. Section 2 of the 1872 Act also provided that if a state gained seats and did not draw a sufficient number of districts, the additional seats would be elected at large. See id. Prior to the 1872 Act, if a state was awarded additional seats, it would forfeit those seats if it did not redraw its districts, because all representatives were required to be elected from districts and no district could elect more than one representative. See ENGSTROM, supra note 36, at 64. This part of section 2 had several perhaps unintended consequences. First, it eliminated a powerful disincentive against refusals to redistrict, The requirement was proposed by Representative James H. Platt, Jr., a Republican from Virginia, who had settled there after serving as a lieutenant colonel in the Union Army during the Civil War.
62
His argument echoed points made during the debate over the 1842 Act, although neither he nor anyone else seemed aware of the earlier proposal:
[N]othing [would] prevent a State, if it chooses to do so, from making half a State one congressional district and dividing the rest of the State among the other members. They can make one district containing any population they choose, and other districts with as small a population as they choose.
63
Perhaps surprisingly-for example, during the same session, members of Congress debated at some length whether to set a uniform national election day 64 -this significant change "provoked no discussion or dissension in either Congress or the press." 65 As with the reduction-of-representation provision contained in the 1872 Act, there was no express enforcement mechanism for the equal inhabitants requirement. 66 The United States of 1920, like the United States of today, was a nation characterized by unease and polarization. Americans lacked "their former confidence in democracy or religion." 74 There was deep distrust between the growing and increasingly cosmopolitan cities and declining small towns in the Midwest and the South. 75 Walter Lippman described a tension between "the new urban civilization with its irresistible economic and scientific and mass power" and "the older American village civilization making its last stand against what to it looks like an alien invasion." 76 Traditionalists perceived a threat "from enclaves of the foreign-born, not yet adapted to American ways," 77 immigrants who seemed racially different from their predecessors. 78 The urban-rural tensions played out in substantive differences over everything from morals legislation-most notably Prohibition-to tax and trade policy. 79 The census of 1920 gave concrete proof of these perceptions. For the first time, a majority of the American population lived in urban places. 80 Not only that: the urban population had grown by nineteen million people during the decade, while the rural population had actually shrunk by five million. 81 For the first time, the census [Vol. 59:1921 published "complete returns on citizenship of the foreign born," and they showed a rapidly changing America.
82
When Congress turned to reapportionment, it found that the huge swings in population produced by both immigration and internal migration during World War I meant that the size of the House would have to swell from 435 to 483 to avoid taking seats away from at least one state. 83 If the House size remained at 435, roughly a dozen states were likely to lose seats, and political power would transfer to large, urban, northeastern states and away from states in the Midwest and South.
84 Population shifts also threatened continued Republican control over Congress. 85 Further, with the admission of New Mexico and Arizona, there was no longer the possibility of creating additional western states in the continental United States to counterbalance the eastern population.
86
At the same time, there was strong opposition to such a massive increase; the New Republic, for example, charged that the House "functions badly enough" at the current size and "did not need more members to add 'their oratory to the legislative babel.'"
87
The demographic realities might have been sufficient on their own to produce a stalemate, but they were further complicated by arguments about the representational base. Civil rights leaders and maverick Massachusetts Representative George Holden Tinkham sought an inquiry into Black disenfranchisement in the South.
88
They pressed the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment's reduction-of-representation clause should come into play to reduce southern states' representation in the House. 89 population. 90 The ensuing disparities in voting rates were staggering. During debates in the House, a representative from West Virginia-then, as now, an overwhelmingly white state 91 -pointed out that in his district, eighty-five thousand votes had been cast in the 1920 election; he contrasted that number with the statewide totals in South Carolina and Mississippi-the two states with the highest proportion of Black residents. 92 In the former, only sixty-eight thousand votes had been cast statewide for all seven of South Carolina's seats combined; in the latter, seventy-one thousand votes had been spread among eight seats.
93
Southern representatives responded with bald-faced denials and racist comments.
94 But they, joined by representatives from predominantly rural states that were at risk of losing seats, also argued for their own change to the representational base: excluding noncitizens. 95 Their arguments contain echoes of contemporary debates over immigration. Representative Edward C. Little from Kansas expressed concern that reapportionment would "turn this government over to the cities where ignorance, poverty, vice, and crime are staring you in the face." 96 Professor Margo Anderson, a scholar of the census, has suggested that Congress's focus was on apportionment, rather than districting:
Some congressmen felt that the language was extraneous. Others argued that the language from old reapportionment bills not specifically repealed by the current bill would remain in force and thus that there was no need to repeat the language. Overall, passage of a viable reapportionment bill was the only question at hand. Districting seemed relatively unimportant.
113
But Professor Charles W. Eagles, who has written the most detailed history of the post-1920 nonapportionment, has hypothesized that the deletion may have been the product of a backroom deal to permit rural members to preserve their seats, even if their districts were losing population. 114 In any event, the precommitment strategy worked, and the post-1930 apportionment proceeded uneventfully-at least as a procedural matter. 115 As a substantive matter, it saw a massive shift in political power. California's delegation shot from eleven members to twenty; meanwhile, twenty-one states lost seats. 116 And in 1941, Congress revised the permanent apportionment bill to provide that seats would be allocated using the method of equal proportions.
117
The modern statutory process for reapportionment was thereby settled and has remained essentially the same for the past seventyfive years, 118 even as the processes of redistricting have undergone a series of revolutions.
III. THE IRONY OF 1929
Perhaps not surprisingly, given that they were responding (or refusing to respond) to twenty years of profound demographic and cultural change, the congressional districting plans states drew following the 1931 reapportionment prompted litigation. Ironically, although lower courts struck down a number of plans with gross population disparities, the Supreme Court read the Apportionment Act of 1929 to permit the very entrenchment within states that the Act counteracted among them.
The lead case before the Court came from Mississippi. As a result of the 1930 census, Mississippi's congressional delegation shrank from eight to seven members.
119 "In 1932, after long and acrimonious battle, it appeared that the Legislature would never agree on any redistricting plan" but "[a]t the last minute, the matter was settled by combining the Seventh and Eighth Districts." large," 124 he sought injunctive relief against use of the new districts in the upcoming election.
The district court agreed. It held that the constraints on districting contained in the 1911 Act were "mandatory and must be followed by the states in fixing congressional districts."
125 Because Mississippi's congressional map was "clearly violative" of the Act, the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction. [Vol. 59:1921
The post-1930 congressional redistricting in Kentucky followed a similar path.
127 Kentucky's allocation had gone from eleven seats to nine-a particularly sharp drop. 128 Given the State's total population, equipopulous districts would have had roughly 290,000 inhabitants each. 129 The State decided to put all of Jefferson County (Louisville) in a single district despite its population of 355,000 people, which was more than enough for a single district but not nearly enough to constitute two full districts. 130 There were 119 remaining counties, only five of which had populations over 60,000, with the average county having a population of 19,000.
131
A three-judge district court found that:
In view of this situation, the Legislature was confronted with no difficulty whatever in dividing these one hundred and nineteen counties into eight congressional districts of substantially equal population, and this without the necessity of dividing any county; and the topography of the state presents no obstacle to carving these districts out of contiguous and compact territory. 132 Indeed, the plaintiffs presented a map showing eight districts, each composed of contiguous whole counties, with population differences of less than 4000 between the most populous and the least. 133 But the State instead created adjacent districts with population disparities of up to 114,000 inhabitants.
134
The district court had no trouble concluding that Kentucky's redistricting violated section 3 of the 1911 Apportionment Act. 135 Given "practical considerations against throwing a part of this county into another congressional district," 136 it thought the legislature's decision to put all of Jefferson County in a single, overpopulated district should not "be regarded as a violation of the spirit of the 139 Comparing the Fifth District to "a French style telephone," with some counties "strung along the river forming the handle" and still others "forming the mouthpiece and receiver respectively," the court concluded that "a visual examination of the outlines upon the map" was "sufficient to repel any presumption of a good-faith attempt on the part of the Legislature to comply with section 3 of the Act of August 8, 1911."
140 As a result, the court declared the entire redistricting act invalid. shows that the omission was deliberate" and made "after debate," id. at 7, exaggerates a bit. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. To be sure, the omission was deliberate, in the sense that Representative Fenn made a motion to strike out the section of Broom, the Supreme Court subsequently reversed the decree in the Kentucky case as well, directing the court to dismiss the complaint. 144 The Supreme Court's brief opinion in Wood v. Broom-issued just five days after oral argument 145 -did not advert to a striking passage in Mississippi's brief defending the post-1930 map. In addition to arguing that the plaintiff 's claim was nonjusticiable because control over congressional districting was confided to Congress and the state legislatures, the State argued that the plan in fact achieved approximate equality "as to number of qualified electors."
146 And how were those electors described? As "native whites. Broom's brief contains a touchingly apologetic conclusion in which his counsel states that the brief "does not measure up to our ideas of what a brief should be and contain" because of the "necessary haste involved in its preparation." Id. at 36. And haste there indeed was: the entire proceeding in the Supreme Court took less than a month, see Wood, 287 U.S. at 1, and Broom's attorneys had to write their brief without seeing the appellant's brief first. See Brief for Appellee, supra, at 3. In general, "repeals by implication are not favored." Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936). The Supreme Court long ago held that when an affirmative statute contains no expression of a purpose to repeal a prior law, it does not repeal it unless the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, or unless the later statute covers the whole ground occupied by the earlier and is clearly intended as a substitute for it, and the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest. Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U.S. 596, 601-02 (1883). Clearly, the 1929 Act replaced the actual apportionment of representatives in the 1911 Act. See Smiley, 285 U.S. at 373. But it would have been entirely possible to continue giving effect to the sections of the 1911 Act-like the equipopulousity requirement in section 3 or the requirement in section 4 that states continue to use the existing districts until new districts were drawn and elect any additional representatives at large-that did not directly allocate seats. Black population. 148 So although the Third Congressional District, located in the Mississippi Delta, had a disproportionately large total population, it had relatively few voters. 149 The Supreme Court completely ignored the racial dynamics behind the Mississippi map. Wood v. Broom effectively took federal courts out of the business of policing congressional district boundaries. 150 And given the difficulties Congress had had in reaching any kind of agreement on apportionment, the decision also effectively took Congress out of the business as well. Over the next several decades, the degree of population imbalance among districts within a state increased. 151 The growing inequality among districts-and the demographic transformation of the United States during and after World War II into a suburban nation-meant there was little likelihood that Congress would restore an equal-population requirement that would result in members losing their seats.
152
The post-1930 congressional redistricting fared differently in state courts. Virginia's constitutions had had requirements for equipopulous congressional districts for more than a century, antedating both the federal requirements for districted elections and the federal directives about the configuration of districts. The Constitution of 1830 had required that Virginia's seats "be apportioned as nearly as may be amongst the several counties, cities, boroughs, and towns of the State, according to their respective numbers." [Vol. 59:1921 was carried forward into the Commonwealth's subsequent constitutions. The version in the Constitution of 1902 mirrored the requirement in the 1911 Federal Apportionment Act: congressional districts were to be "composed of contiguous and compact territory, containing as near as practicable an equal number of inhabitants." 154 The Commonwealth's post-1860, post-1870, and post-1880 maps were striking for their degree of population equality, particularly given Virginia's "unbroken custom to refrain from dividing any county or city into separate districts." 155 Like Mississippi, Virginia lost one of its congressional seats following the 1930 census. And like Mississippi, it responded not by redrawing its entire map, but essentially through a "compromise" that combined two of the preexisting districts to create a district that was "the largest in the State and by far the most unwieldy politically." 156 The upshot was a plan where the largest district was more than 67,000 people above the ideal district size of "269,092-1/9," 157 and the smallest was more than 85,000 people below.
Several Republican candidates challenged the plan as violative of both section 3 of the 1911 Reapportionment Act and section 55 of the Virginia Constitution. Recognizing that there were "divergent views" among other state and federal courts "both as to whether or not there is in effect any regulation by Congress, and as to the authority of Congress to make such regulation," 158 the court resolved III, § 6). Like the original Art. I, § 2 of the Federal Constitution, the Virginia provision contained a three-fifths clause. Id. 154. VA. CONST. of 1902, art. IV, § 55. 155. Brown, 166 S.E. at 107-08. For statistics about the district populations, see id. at 110 n.1. In 1868-not surprisingly, Virginia only drew its post-1860 districts once it was readmitted to the Union following the Civil War-for example, the ideal district size would have been 152,489.75 people. The least populous district was only 5662 people below the ideal and the most populous district was only 8244 people above the ideal. Id. The deviations in the 1872 plan and the 1883 plans were of similar magnitudes. The population disparities began to rise with the post-1890 redistricting. The court rejected the government's argument that congressional redistricting was "a legislative matter, ... not subject to judicial review."
160 While the job of drawing districts was, "in a sense, political," and the legislature thus had "necessarily wide discretion," the limits section 55 placed "on the discretion of the Legislature" were judicially enforceable. 161 Although there might be close cases, the court had "no uncertainty" about its conclusion given the map before it: "The inequality is obvious, indisputable, and excessive." 162 The legislature could easily have drawn districts with more equal populations through simply moving some counties into adjacent districts.
Having found the district configurations unconstitutional, the court was faced with the question of remedy. Precisely because drawing districts was a legislative duty, the court concluded that it "necessarily follow[ed]" from the absence of a valid legislative redistricting, that "it will be necessary for the electors in the state at large to select the nine members to represent the state in the national Legislature." 163 The 1932 congressional elections in Virginia were thus conducted at large, with the Commonwealth's one Republican representative losing his seat-at the time, the sole seat held by his party in the entire South. 164 [Vol. 59:1921 In Illinois, however, a decision striking down a post-1930 redistricting on malapportionment grounds remained in effect, with even more ironic consequences. 166 The size of Illinois's congressional delegation remained unchanged between 1910 and 1930, with twentyseven members. 167 Nevertheless, Illinois redrew its congressional districts in 1931. 168 And it created districts whose populations ranged from 158,738 in the smallest district to 541,785 in the largest. 169 The Supreme Court of Illinois struck down the plan on both federal and state law grounds. With respect to federal law, the court had "no hesitancy" in concluding that the equipopulousity requirement in the 1911 Apportionment Act remained "in full force and effect."
170 It viewed the 1929 Act as directed solely at apportionment, making no provision one way or the other "with reference to the manner of electing representatives."
171 It saw nothing in the 1929 Act to "justif[y] the claim that it repealed the act of 1911, either in without change after the 1960 census when a gubernatorial commission reported that "[t]o bring the districts to approximately equal population would involve changes of doubtful practicality, the dissolution of districts which have the greatest community of interest, and mean a radical restructuring of the State." Id. at 852. The Virginia Supreme Court acknowledged that redrawing the districts might undercut the interest in having districts reflect cohesive "communit[ies] of interest." Id. at 853. But citing Brown v. Saunders, it declared that "community of interest is not the only requirement, or even one of the requirements spelled out in the Constitution. There must be, as nearly as practicable, an equal number of inhabitants in the districts." Id. Because it was possible to achieve far more equality of population by redrawing the boundaries between districts, the plan was unconstitutional. (The court also emphasized that in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), requiring equipopulous congressional districts as a matter of federal constitutional law, the Virginia plan was doubly unconstitutional. Wilkins, 139 S.E.2d at 854.) Once again, however, the court declined to order the State to redraw the districts, providing instead only that at-large elections would be used until such a plan was drawn. express terms or by implication ... so far as it relates to the formation of congressional districts." 172 To the contrary, the Illinois court thought
[t]he conclusion [was] irresistible that Congress wanted to make decennial apportionments a certainty and did not intend to release its control over the manner of electing representatives. We cannot bring ourselves to the belief that Congress intended to forsake the field of legislation which it had completely occupied for more than half a century.
173
Because it would have been eminently possible to reallocate counties between adjacent districts to create more equipopulous ones, the 1931 map violated federal law.
174
But even if it had not, the court held that the 1931 Illinois redistricting act violated a provision of the Illinois Constitution that required all elections to be "free and equal." 175 The court explained that "[e]lections are equal when the vote of each voter is equal in its influence upon the result to the vote of every other elector-where each ballot is as effective as every other ballot."
176 Because districts with different numbers of "inhabitants will work inequality in right of suffrage and of power in elections of the representatives in Congress," the 1931 redistricting act was "not only obnoxious to the laws of Congress but to the Constitution of this state."
177
But the Illinois court's decision long predated the rise of structural reform injunctions in which courts either required the legislature to develop a new proposal or drew the districts themselves. Thus, the decision had the perverse consequence of simply reinstating the preexisting 1901 congressional map, which had even greater population disparities, but which had not been challenged. And so the ultimate "solution" to the reapportionment crisis created by the growing power of the urban population of the nation was to reapportion congressional seats among the states but to allow the states themselves to malapportion those seats within the states.... [Congress] would cheat and change the rules of the apportionment game to preserve rural and small-town dominance of legislative halls for another generation. These actions eventually precipitated another reapportionment crisis, the "reapportionment revolution" of the 1960s. ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 157.
189. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 551 (plurality opinion). It seems entirely plausible that Congress would similarly have acquiesced if the Supreme Court had affirmed the Mississippi and Kentucky federal courts that had struck down those two states' post-1930 congressional redistrictings. Congressional inertia, particularly after the bruising battle that had eventually been ended by the permanent Apportionment Act of 1929, is not a particularly powerful sign that the Court properly gleaned Congress's original intentions.
[Vol. 59:1921 involve an issue "of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial determination." 190 Justice Frankfurter's historical support for this proposition came not from battles over redistricting, but from the history of apportionment. He began by asserting that "[t]he one stark fact that emerges from a study of the history of Congressional apportionment is its embroilment in politics, in the sense of party contests and party interests."
191 He then pointed to the Apportionments Clause directive that Congress apportion seats according to respective population and wrote that "Congress has at times been heedless of this command and not apportioned according to the requirements of the Census."
192 But as we have already seen, there had been only one such time-after the 1920 census. 193 And while it was true that states had frequently disregarded Congress's directives that districts be compact and have roughly equal numbers of inhabitants, the Justice's position that courts could not enforce such directives ultimately seemed to rest not so much on the political nature of the plaintiffs' claims, but rather on the limited nature of courts' remedial powers:
[N]o court can affirmatively re-map the Illinois districts so as to bring them more in conformity with the standards of fairness for a representative system. At best we could only declare the existing electoral system invalid. The result would be to leave Illinois undistricted and to bring into operation, if the Illinois legislature chose not to act, the choice of members for the House of Representatives on a state-wide ticket. The last stage may be worse than the first. 194 In any event, Colegrove postponed the Court's intervention into the redistricting process for a generation. 195 And when that intervention came, it began with a decision, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, whose author insisted it was "not Colegrove v. Green." 196 A major impetus for the Court's entry into the political thicket was its sense that underpopulated districts produced reactionary policies, most notably in the Jim Crow South. 197 Chief Justice Warren "used to say that if Reynolds v. Sims had been decided before 1954, Brown v. Board of Education would have been unnecessary." 198 The connection between districts frozen in time and the inability of legislatures to address pressing national concerns was well understood. 199 Although the Court framed its decisions in the one-person, one-vote cases in rhetorically individualistic terms, everyone understood their racial implications. 200 A primary consequence of the one-person, one-vote cases was that they required decennial redistricting focused on population equality, realigning that process with the decennial reapportionment also focused on population equality. The relative stability of the permanent Reapportionment Act of 1929, which has remained essentially the same through decades that saw fundamental transformations of American society and politics, 202 suggests the wisdom of a precommitment strategy behind even a modest veil of ignorance. It is striking that Congress managed to craft a default regime for reapportionment after more than a century of heated contention, but that few jurisdictions have managed to produce anything remotely similar with regard to redistricting.
The historical experience with reapportionment also reminds us that there can be a series of unintentional consequences over time from choices about apportionment and redistricting processes. 203 The Supreme Court's decision in Wood v. Broom contributed to the growing inequality among district populations that created the pressure for its later declaration of a constitutional constraint on the configuration of districts.
So, too, with the reliance on expert views to choose apportionment rules. Both apportionment methods approved in the 1929 Reapportionment Act-the method of major fractions and the method of equal proportions (since 1941, the only approved method) 204 -were proposed by relatively disinterested scholars. 205 The Speaker of the House sought to break the logjam by asking a National Academy of the States to find their own solutions. Since then, despite repeated efforts to obtain congressional action again, Congress has continued to leave the problem and its solution to the States. It cannot be contended, therefore, that the Court's decision today fills a gap left by the Congress. On the contrary, the Court substitutes its own judgment for that of the Congress. Sciences panel to address the question, and Congress ultimately accepted the panel's advice. 206 But by 1941, politics returned to the process, and Congress chose the method of equal proportions as the sole default measure because it transferred a seat from a Republican-dominated state to a solidly Democratic one. 207 We can expect in the post-2020 round of redistricting that social scientists will again offer redistricting criteria. It will be especially interesting to see whether the Supreme Court adopts any of the measures of excessive partisanship that have been recently offered by scholars. 208 If it does, we should expect partisan interests to seek to use the methods and measures in the service of seeking political advantage in the redistricting process.
At the opposite end of the empirical spectrum, just as we saw claims of miscounts, fraud, and manipulation with respect to the census figures in 1920, 209 we might expect to see similar resistance to the evidence post-2020. This resistance may be a reflection of an era where politicians are already raising unsupported claims of voter fraud and miscounted ballots. 210 This feeds into a climate of rising anti-immigration sentiment. The interaction of apportionment issues and immigration issues that characterized the 1920s may well reappear during the post-2020 round of redistricting. In 2016, the Supreme Court confronted a version of this issue in Evenwel v. Abbott. 211 A group of Texas voters who lived in state legislative districts with particularly high percentages of registered voters brought suit, claiming that Texas should be required to equalize the number of eligible voters, rather than the number of inhabitants within each district. 212 As with the analogous claim in the post-1920 debate, the choice would have major political consequences, redistributing seats away from [Vol. 59:1921 communities with large numbers of noncitizens and toward whiter, and generally more conservative, communities.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's opinion for the Court rejected the plaintiffs' claims. 213 Focusing initially on the history of congressional apportionment, she pointed out that both the Framers and the Reconstruction Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment used a population base, rather than a voter base, for allocating seats in the House. 214 Using a population base for state-level redistricting was consistent with this constitutional history. 215 But the Court pointedly did not resolve whether " [s] tates may draw districts to equalize voter-eligible population rather than total population." 216 I predict we will see efforts in several jurisdictions with growing immigrant populations to use citizen-based, rather than total population-based, numbers for drawing districts.
217 Those efforts will raise, once again, fundamental questions about representation and equality in a democracy.
Finally, we can expect that race will continue to play a significant role, both express and implicit, in our politics. I would not be surprised to see renewed attention post-2020, as we saw post-1920, to Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment-not so much with respect to a realistic possibility that any state will actually lose seats in Congress, but rather as a device for focusing attention on the various ways in which some states have moved to depress voter turnout, particularly among poor and minority communities.
Understanding the complex history of the post-1920 reapportionment is hardly a roadmap to the post-2020 round. But as C.S. Lewis reminded us long ago, understanding the past is valuable not because "the past has any magic about it, but because we cannot study the future, and yet need something to set against the present, to remind us that ... much which seems certain to the uneducated is merely temporary fashion."
218 Understanding how that reapportionment played out, in a time of polarization, uncertainty, inequality, and cultural conflict, may give us at least a little traction as we confront the question of how to allocate political power in yet another such time.
